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Abstract
We introduce the two-step average tree value for transferable utility games with
restricted cooperation represented by undirected communication graphs or hy-
pergraphs. The solution can be considered as an alternative for both the average
tree solution for graph games and the average tree value for hypergraph games.
Instead of averaging players’ marginal contributions corresponding to all admis-
sible rooted spanning trees of the underlying (hyper)graph, which determines
the average tree solution or value, we consider a two-step averaging procedure,
in which in the first step for each player the average of players’ marginal con-
tributions corresponding to all admissible rooted spanning trees that have this
player as the root is calculated, and in the second step the average over all play-
ers of all the payoffs obtained in the first step is computed. In general these
two approaches lead to different solution concepts. When each component in the
underlying communication structure is cycle-free, a linear cactus with cycles, or
the complete graph, the two-step average tree value coincides with the average
tree value. A comparative analysis of both solution concepts is done and an ax-
iomatization of the the two-step average tree value on the subclass of TU games
with semi-cycle-free hypergraph communication structure, which is more general
than that given by a cycle-free hypergraph, is obtained.
Keywords: TU game; hypergraph communication structure; average tree value;
component fairness
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1 Introduction
In classical cooperative game theory it is assumed that any coalition of players may
form and realize its worth, and fair distribution of total rewards among the players
takes into account capacities of all coalitions. For example, the most prominent solu-
tion of cooperative games with transferable utility, or TU games, the Shapley value, cf.
Shapley (1953), assigns to each player as a payoff the average of the player’s marginal
contributions to his predecessors with respect to all possible linear orderings of the
players. However, in many practical situations the collection of feasible coalitions is
restricted by some social, economical, communication, or technical structure. The
study of transferable utility games with limited cooperation introduced by means of
an undirected communication graph, called for brevity graph games, is initiated in
Myerson (1977). Assuming that only connected players can cooperate, the Myerson
value for graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the so-called restricted game
for which the worth of each coalition is equal to the sum of the worths of its connected
components in the graph. Lately several other solutions for graph games based also
on Myerson’s assumption that only connected players can cooperate are proposed, in
particular, the average tree solution, introduced by Herings, van der Laan, and Tal-
man, cf. Herings et al. (2008), for cycle-free graph games and generalized by Herings,
van der Laan, Talman, and Yang, cf. Herings et al. (2010), for the class of all graph
games. In comparison to the Myerson value the average tree solution is stable on the
subclass of superadditive cycle-free graph games and for cycle-free graph games the
order of computational complexity of the average tree solution is linear in the number
of players, while it is exponential for the Myerson value.
Yet, the communication graphs reflect only bilateral communication between the
players. The idea of consideration of cooperative games with a more general commu-
nication structure, allowing to represent communication within sets of more than two
players appears first in Myerson (1980), where NTU games with conference structure
are investigated. In fact a conference in terms of Myerson coincides with a hyper-
link of a hypergraph. TU games with hypergraph communication structure, called for
brevity hypergraph games, are formally introduced by van den Nouweland, Borm, and
Tijs, cf. van den Nouweland et al. (1992), where also the Myerson and position values1
for hypergraph games are defined and axiomatized. Recently the average tree value
for hypergraph games, which generalizes the average tree solution for graph games to
hypergraph games, has been introduced and investigated by Kang, Khmelnitskaya,
Shan, Talman, and Zhang in Kang et al. (2020).
The goal of this paper is to introduce a two-step average tree value for hypergraph
games, and in particular for graph games, which can be considered as an alternative
to the average tree value. Similar to the average tree value for graph and hyper-
graph games, the new solution is based on the idea that the payoff to a player is
determined by averaging of the player’s marginal contributions with respect to all
1The position value for graph games is first defined in Meessen (1988) and later studied and
axiomatized by Borm, Owen, and Tijs, cf. Borm et al. (1992).
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admissible rooted spanning trees of the given communication structure. Since in gen-
eral for distinct players the numbers of admissible rooted spanning trees having these
players as the roots might be different, the simultaneous averaging via all admissible
rooted spanning trees unwittingly implies that the players, being the roots of admis-
sible rooted spanning trees, participate in the definition of the average tree value with
weights determined by the numbers of admissible rooted spanning trees having the
corresponding players as their roots. The latter in a sense conflicts with the idea that
every player in a (hyper)graph game is equally important. To eliminate this drawback
we consider a two-step averaging procedure, in which in the first step for each player
the average of players’ marginal contributions corresponding to all admissible rooted
spanning trees having this player as the root is calculated, and in the second step
the average over all players of all the payoffs obtained in the first step is computed.
A comparative analysis of both average tree solution concepts shows that the better
structured averaging procedure underlying the two-step average tree value provides
it with additional attractive properties that are valid also on wider subclasses of hy-
pergraph games. Furthermore, an axiomatization of the two-step average tree value
on the class of semi-cycle-free hypergraph games, which includes all cycle-free hyper-
graph games as a proper subclass, is provided, and its core stability for superadditive
quasi-cycle-free hypergraph games is obtained.
The paper is organized as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given in
Section 2. In Section 3 the two-step average tree value for (hyper)graph games is
introduced and the cases of its coincidence with the average tree value are investigated.
Section 4 is devoted to study the properties of the two-step average tree value in
comparison with the properties of the average tree value. Section 5 provides an
axiomatic characterization of the two-step average tree value. Section 6 examines the
core stability.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic
function, with v(∅) = 0, assigning to every coalition S ⊆ N its worth v(S), which
can be freely distributed as payoff among the members of S. We denote by GN
the set of TU games with fixed player set N . For simplicity of notation and if no
ambiguity appears we write v instead of (N, v). A game v ∈ GN is superadditive if
v(S ∪Q) ≥ v(S) + v(Q) for all S,Q ⊆ N satisfying S ∩Q = ∅. The unanimity game
with respect to coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} is the game uS ∈ GN defined as uS(Q) = 1 if
S ⊆ Q and 0 otherwise. For a finite set S, |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
A communication structure on the set of players N is specified by a graph or
hypergraph on N . A hypergraph on N is a set H ⊆ {e ∈ 2N | |e| ≥ 2} of hyperlinks.
A hypergraph H is r-uniform if |e| = r for all e ∈ H. A 2-uniform hypergraph on
N is an (undirected) graph on N and is denoted by a set of links Γ ⊆ ΓN , where
ΓN = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is the complete graph on N . We denote by HN (ΓN )
the set of hypergraphs (graphs) on N .
Let H ∈ HN . For i ∈ N , Hi = {e ∈ H | e 3 i} is the set of hyperlinks in
H containing i with |Hi| the degree of i in H. A player i is non-connective in H if
|Hi| ≤ 1, otherwise player i is connective in H. Two players i and j are interactive in
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H if Hi 6= ∅ and Hj = Hi. A player j is adjacent to player i in H if i, j ∈ e for some
e ∈ H. A sequence C = (i1, e1, i2, e2, . . . , ik−1, ek−1, ik), with k ≥ 2, is a chain in H
between player i1 and player ik if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) i1, . . . , ik−1
are distinct players in N , (ii) i2, . . . , ik are distinct players in N , (iii) e1, . . . , ek−1
are distinct hyperlinks in H, and (iv) it+1, it ∈ et for all t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. For a
chain C = (i1, e1, i2, e2, . . . , ik−1, ek−1, ik) in H, N(C) =
⋃k−1
t=1 et is the set of players
contained in C and the sequence (i1, i2, . . . , ik) is a path in H between players i1 and
ik. H is connected if n=1 or there exists a chain in H between every two distinct
players in N . A chain (i1, e1, i2, e2, . . . , ik−1, ek−1, ik) in H is a cycle in H if k ≥ 3
and i1 = ik. H is cycle-free if there is no cycle in H and H is linear if |e ∩ e′| ≤ 1
for every two distinct e, e′ ∈ H. Note that a cycle-free hypergraph is linear, because
{i1, i2} ⊆ e1∩e2, e1 6= e2, implies that (i1, e1, i2, e2, i1) is a cycle. H is a cactus if H is
connected and any two distinct cycles in H have at most one player in common, i.e.,
|N(C) ∩N(C ′)| ≤ 1 for every two distinct cycles C,C ′ in H. Note that a connected
cycle-free hypergraph is a linear cactus, but a cactus might be nonlinear as well, for
example, H = {e1, e2}, where e1 = {1, 2, 3} and e2 = {2, 3, 4}.
For S ⊆ N , H|S = {e ∈ H | e ⊆ S} is the subhypergraph of H induced by S. A
coalition S ⊆ N is connected in H if H|S is connected, i.e., |S| = 1 or there exists
a chain in H|S between every two distinct players in S. CH(S) denotes the set of
subsets of S ⊆ N that are connected in H. For S ⊆ N , Q is a component of S in H,
if Q is a maximal connected subset of S in H. S/H denotes the set of components of
S ⊆ N in H. A hyperlink e ∈ H is a bridge in H if |N/H| < |N/(H\{e})|.
A rooted tree on a component K ∈ N/H of N in H is a set T ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ K, i 6=
j} of directed links with one player r(T ), the root of T , satisfying that (i, r(T )) /∈ T for
all i ∈ K and for every i ∈ K, i 6= r(T ), there is a unique directed path (i1, . . . , ik) in
T from i1 to ik, where i1 = r(T ), ik = i, and (ih, ih+1) ∈ T for all h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
If there exists a directed path in T from i to j, then j is a successor of i and i is a
predecessor of j in T , and if (i, j) ∈ T , then j is an immediate successor of i and i is
an immediate predecessor of j in T . For i ∈ K, STi and ŜTi denote the set of successors
and the set of immediate successors of i in T , respectively, and S̄Ti = S
T
i ∪ {i}. T is
a rooted spanning tree of H|K if (i, j) ∈ T implies {i, j} ⊆ e for some e ∈ H|S̄Ti . A
rooted spanning tree T of H|K is admissible if (i, j) ∈ T implies S̄Tj ∈ STi /H. T H(K)
denotes the set of admissible rooted spanning trees of H|K and, for r ∈ K, T Hr (K)
denotes the set of admissible rooted spanning trees in T H(K) having r as the root.
A game with hypergraph communication structure, or hypergraph game, is a triple
(N, v,H), or shortly (v,H), where v ∈ GN is a TU game and H ∈ HN is a hypergraph
on N . When H is a graph Γ on N , (v,Γ) is a graph game. For fixed player set N , GHN




N ) the set of connected
hypergraph (graph) games, and GHcfN (GΓ
cf
N ) the set of cycle-free hypergraph (graph)
games. The hypergraph-restricted game of a hypergraph game (v,H) ∈ GHN is the TU
game vH ∈ GN , where vH(S) =
∑
Q∈S/H v(Q) for all S ∈ 2N . A payoff vector is a
vector x ∈ IRn that assigns payoff xi to player i ∈ N . For a subset of hypergraph
games G ⊆ GHN , a value on G is a mapping ξ : G → IR
n that assigns to every (v,H) ∈ G
a payoff vector ξ(v,H) ∈ IRn with ξi(v,H) as the payoff to player i ∈ N .
Following Myerson (1980) it is assumed that in a game with hypergraph commu-
nication structure each player can communicate with himself and all other players
in a hyperlink he belongs to, moreover, all players of a hyperlink have to be present
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before communication between its members can take place. Therefore, only coalitions
that are connected in the hypergraph are able to communicate in order to cooperate
and realize their worth. A connected coalition in a hypergraph is either a singleton
player or a single hyperlink or the connected union of two or more hyperlinks in the
hypergraph. The set of connected coalitions in a hypergraph is a building set2, cf.
Koshevoy and Talman (2014). Note that different hypergraphs may have the same
set of connected coalitions.
For a hypergraph game (v,H) ∈ GHN and component K ∈ N/H, the marginal
contribution of player i ∈ K corresponding to admissible rooted spanning tree T ∈
T H(K) is given by






Since STi /H = {S̄Tj }j∈ŜTi , for every i ∈ K it holds that






being player i’s contribution in worth to his immediate successors and their successors
in the tree.
The average tree value (AT value) for hypergraph games, introduced for graph
games in Herings et al. (2008, 2010) and generalized for hypergraph games in Kang






mTi (v,H), i ∈ K, K ∈ N/H, (2)
being player i’s average marginal contribution corresponding to all admissible rooted
spanning trees on the component the player belongs to. In particular, to a graph






mTi (v,Γ), i ∈ K, K ∈ N/Γ. (3)
• A value ξ satisfies component efficiency (CE ) on G ⊆ GHN , if for every (v,H) ∈ G
and K ∈ N/H it holds that
∑
i∈K ξi(v,H) = v(K).
• A value ξ satisfies component fairness (CF ) on G ⊆ GHN , if for every (v,H) ∈ G

















for all distinct K,K ′ ∈ N/(H\{e}) satisfying K ∩ e 6= ∅ and K ′ ∩ e 6= ∅.
The average tree value is component efficient and on the subclass of cycle-free
(hyper)graph games it is the unique solution that satisfies both component efficiency
and component fairness, see Herings et al. (2008) and Kang et al. (2020).
2A collection of coalitions B on N is a building set on N if (i) for any S,Q ∈ B such that S∩Q 6= ∅
it holds that S ∪Q ∈ B, and (ii) {i} ∈ B for all i ∈ B, and therefore, it is also a union stable system,
cf. Algaba et al. (2001).
5
3 The two-step average tree value
3.1 Motivation and definition
We introduce a two-step average tree value for hypergraph games, and in particular
for graph games, which similar to the average tree value for graph and hypergraph
games is based on the idea that the payoff to a player is determined by averaging
of the player’s marginal contributions with respect to all admissible rooted spanning
trees of the given communication structure. Since in general for distinct players the
numbers of admissible rooted spanning trees having these players as the roots might
be different, the simultaneous averaging over all admissible rooted spanning trees
unwittingly implies that the players, being the roots of admissible rooted spanning
trees, participate in the definition of the average tree value with weights determined
by the numbers of admissible rooted spanning trees having the corresponding players
as their roots. The latter in a sense conflicts with the idea that every player in a
(hyper)graph game is equally important. To eliminate this drawback we consider a
two-step averaging procedure, in which in the first step for each player the average of
players’ marginal contributions corresponding to all admissible rooted spanning trees
having this player as the root is calculated, and in the second step the average over
all players of all the payoffs obtained in the first step is computed. As we can see
later from the comparative analysis of both average tree solution concepts, the better
structured averaging procedure underlying the two-step average tree value provides
it with additional attractive properties valid on wider subclasses of hypergraph games.
The two-step average tree value (TAT value) for hypergraph games assigns to










mTi (v,H), i ∈ K, K ∈ N/H. (4)
In particular, to a graph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN , the TAT value assigns the payoff










mTi (v,Γ), i ∈ K, K ∈ N/Γ. (5)
3.2 The TAT value versus the AT value
The following example shows that the TAT value may differ from the AT value.
Example 1 Consider the graph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN on a set N of 4 players with
v = u{1,2} and Γ = {`1, `2, `3, `4, `5}, where `1 = {1, 2}, `2 = {1, 3}, `3 = {1, 4},
`4 = {2, 3}, `5 = {3, 4}, as depicted in Figure 1.
As depicted in Figure 2, Γ has three admissible rooted spanning trees with player
1 as the root, four with player 2 as the root, three with player 3 as the root, and four




































1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
2 3 4 1 1 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 3 3
3 3 3 4 1 4 1 1 2 3 1 2
2 4 2 4
4 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 3 2 2 1
Figure 2: The admissible rooted spanning trees of Γ in Example 1
From (1) we obtain the following fourteen marginal contribution vectors:
mT
1
1 (v,Γ) = mT
2
1 (v,Γ) = mT
3
1 (v,Γ) = (1, 0, 0, 0),
mT
1
2 (v,Γ) = mT
2
2 (v,Γ) = mT
3
2 (v,Γ) = mT
4
2 (v,Γ) = (0, 1, 0, 0),
mT
1
3 (v,Γ) = mT
3
3 (v,Γ) = (1, 0, 0, 0), mT
2
3 (v,Γ) = (0, 1, 0, 0),
mT
1
4 (v,Γ) = mT
2
4 (v,Γ) = mT
3
4 (v,Γ) = (1, 0, 0, 0), mT
4













































In some specific cases the TAT and AT values coincide.
Theorem 1 The TAT and AT values for a hypergraph game coincide if each com-
ponent in the underlying hypergraph is cycle-free, a linear cactus with cycles, or a
complete graph.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that the underlying hypergraph H ∈ HN is
connected. Let H be a linear cactus without or with cycles. Recall that a connected
cycle-free hypergraph is a linear cactus without cycles. We first show that |T Hr (N)| =
2c for all r ∈ N , where c ∈ N ∪ {0} is the number of cycles in H. Since two different
cycles in H have at most one player in common, the number c is well defined. We
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prove the assertion by induction on the number of cycles. If H has no cycles and
therefore c = 0, it is obvious that |T Hr (N)| = 1 and therefore |T Hr (N)| = 20 for all
r ∈ N .
Assume that this assertion holds true for every linear cactus with less than c cycles
for some c > 0. We show that the assertion holds true for any linear cactus H ∈ HN
with c cycles as well. Take any r ∈ N and T ∈ T Hr (N). Since T is a rooted tree on
N , there exists a unique i ∈ N such that S̄Ti is minimal among S̄Tj , j ∈ N , containing





for all T ′ ∈ T Hr (N). Therefore, |T Hr (N)| = |T Hi (S̄Ti )|. To prove that |T Hi (S̄Ti )| = 2c,
let the components in STi /H be denoted by K1, . . . ,Ks,Ks+1, . . . ,Kt, where Kj ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, is such that one of the cycles in H|Kj∪{i} contains i, and where Kj ,
j ∈ {s+1, . . . , t}, is such that no cycle in H|Kj∪{i}, if any, contains i. For j = 1, . . . , t
let cj denote the number of cycles in H|Kj , then
∑s
j=1(cj + 1) +
∑t
j=s+1 cj = c and
0 ≤ cj < c for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Note that t ≥ 2 when s = 0, because S̄Ti is the
minimal successor set in T containing all cycles in H.
Let F Ti = {j ∈ STi | i, j ∈ e, e ∈ H|S̄Ti } be the set of successors of i in T




i for all T
′ ∈ T Hr (N) and
denote this set by F ri . Since H is a linear cactus, it holds that |Kj ∩ F ri | = 2 for
j = 1, . . . , s and |Kj ∩ F ri | = 1 for j = s + 1, . . . , t. For j ∈ {1, . . . , s} and with
Kj ∩ F ri = {h, k}, it follows from the induction argument and the fact that H|Kj
is a linear cactus with cj < c cycles that |T Hh (Kj)| = 2cj and |T Hk (Kj)| = 2cj , and
therefore |T Hi (Kj ∪ {i})| = 2cj+1. For j ∈ {s+ 1, . . . , t} and with Kj ∩ F ri = {h}, it
follows from the induction argument and the fact that H|Kj is a linear cactus with
cj < c cycles that |T Hh (Kj)| = 2cj , and therefore |T Hi (Kj ∪ {i})| = 2cj . Since the
rooted trees in T Hi (Kj∪{i}), j = 1, . . . , t, can be chosen in any combination to be the
rooted subtrees with root i of admissible rooted spanning trees in T Hi (S̄Ti ), it holds
that
|T Hi (S̄Ti )| =
t∏
j=1
|T Hi (Kj ∪ {i})| = 2c.
This shows that |T Hr (N)| = 2c for all r ∈ N and therefore |T H(N)| =
∑
r∈N |T Hr (N)| =
2cn. Hence, for a hypergraph game (v,H) ∈ GHN with H being a linear cactus with c






















(n− 1)! for all r ∈ N and |T ΓN (N)| = n! and therefore
















= AT (v,ΓN ).
If the underlying communication structure is the complete graph, the TAT and
AT values for a graph game (v,ΓN ) ∈ GΓN coincide with the Shapley value for the TU
game v.
4 Properties of the TAT value
The TAT value for hypergraph games, similar to the AT value, meets component
efficiency on the entire class of hypergraph games GHN .
Theorem 2 The TAT value on GHN satisfies CE.









































Moreover, the TAT value on GHN satisfies the total cooperation equal treatment
property.
• A value ξ satisfies the total cooperation equal treatment property (TCETP) on
G ⊆ GHN , if for every (v,H) ∈ G and K ∈ N/H, such that v(S) = 0 for all
S ∈ CH(K) \ {K}, it holds that ξi(v,H) = ξj(v,H) for all i, j ∈ K.
TCETP states that if in a component of the (hyper)graph every proper connected
coalition is powerless, then all players in the component get the same payoff. The
TCETP is a quite natural property of fair division, which reflects the situation when
cooperation is feasible only within an entire component if all players together may
contribute in worth of the component they belong to, i.e., the presence of each player
is equally important in order to communicate and cooperate, and therefore, all players
of the component are rewarded by equal payoffs.
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Theorem 3 The TAT value on GHN satisfies TCETP.
Proof. Take any (v,H) ∈ GHN and K ∈ N/H satisfying v(S) = 0 for all S ∈
CH(K) \ {K}. By (1), for every T ∈ T H(N) it holds that
mTi (v,H) =
{
v(K), i = r(T ),
0, i ∈ K \ {r(T )}.




, i ∈ K.
Example 2 shows that the AT value, different from the TAT value, does not meet
TCETP.
Example 2 Consider a graph game (v,Γ) ∈ GΓN on a set N of 4 players with v = uN
and Γ as in Example 1. For every T ∈ T Γ(N) it holds that
mTi (v,Γ) =
{
1, i = r(T ),









4) and AT (v,Γ)
(3)







It turns out that the TAT value satisfies component fairness not only on the class
of cycle-free hypergraph games, as the AT value, but also on a wider class of hyper-
graph games, for which the underlying hypergraph is quasi-cycle-free.
A hypergraph H ∈ HN is quasi-cycle-free if there exists a cycle-free hypergraph
H ′ ∈ HN ′ for some N ′ satisfying
(i) N ′ ⊆ N and |H ′| = |H|;
(ii) e′ ∈ H ′ if and only if e′ = e ∩N ′ for some e ∈ H;
(iii) For every j ∈ N \N ′ it holds that |Hj | ≥ 2 and j ∈ e1 ∩ e2 for some e1, e2 ∈ H,
e1 6= e2, implies e′1 ∩ e′2 6= ∅, where e′1 = e1 ∩N ′ and e′2 = e2 ∩N ′.
From the definition it follows immediately that a cycle-free hypergraph is quasi-
cycle-free. However, a quasi-cycle-free hypergraph may contain cycles. A quasi-cycle-
free hypergraph is derived from a cycle-free hypergraph by adding players, if any,
to the intersection of hyperlinks. The added players do not change the hyperlink
structure of the original cycle-free hypergraph.
Figure 3 depicts in b) a quasi-cycle-free hypergraph H that is not cycle-free and
is induced by the cycle-free hypergraph H ′ depicted in a). In e1 ∩ e2 one player from
N \N ′ is added to the single player from e′1∩e′2, and in e1∩e3 two players from N \N ′
are added to the same single player, which belongs also to e′1 ∩ e′3. Since |e1 ∩ e2| = 2
and |e1 ∩ e3| = 3, H is not linear, and therefore, has cycles.










Figure 3: Cycle-free hypergraph H ′ and quasi-cycle-free hypergraph H
Lemma 1 Every hyperlink of a quasi-cycle-free hypergraph is a bridge.
Proof. Suppose there exist a quasi-cycle-free hypergraph H ∈ HN and a hyperlink
e ∈ H such that |N/H| = |N/(H \ {e})|. Let K ∈ N/H be such that e ∈ H|K .
Then |N/H| = |N/(H \ {e})| implies that K ∈ N/(H \ {e}), and therefore, K is
connected in H \ {e}. Let H ′ on N ′ be a cycle-free hypergraph inducing H. Let
e′ = e ∩ N ′. Since e′ ∈ H ′, |e′| ≥ 2. Take any i, j ∈ e′. Since K is connected in
H \ {e}, there exists a chain (i1, e1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ek−1, ik) in H \ {e} between i and j
satisfying i1 = i, ik = j, and et 6= e for all t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Let i′1 = i, i′k = j,
e′t = et ∩ N ′ for all t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and i′t ∈ e′t ∩ e′t−1 for all t ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}.
Because H ′ is the inducing cycle-free hypergraph for H and e1, . . . , ek−1 are distinct
hyperlinks in H\{e}, e′1, . . . , e′k−1 are distinct hyperlinks in H ′\{e′} and e′t 6= e′ for all
t ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}. If all i′1, . . . , i′k are distinct, the sequence (i′1, e′1, i′2 . . . , i′k−1, e′k−1, i′k)
is a chain in H ′ \ {e′} between i and j, and (i′1, e′1, i′2 . . . , i′k−1, e′k−1, i′k, e′, i′1) is a cycle
in H ′, which contradicts that H ′ is cycle-free. Otherwise, if some i′1, . . . , i
′
k coincide, to
obtain a chain in H ′\{e′} between i and j we replace in the sequence any subsequence
between two identical players by this player. Then by adding e′ to this chain we obtain
again a cycle in H ′, contradicting the cycle-freeness of H ′.
The next theorem states that when the underlying hypergraph is quasi-cycle-free,
the TAT value meets CF. From now on the class of quasi-cycle-free hypergraph games
on player set N we denote by GHqcfN .
Theorem 4 The TAT value on GHqcfN satisfies CF.
Proof. Take any (v,H) ∈ GHqcfN and e ∈ H. Let K ∈ N/H be such that e ∈ H|K .
From Lemma 1 it follows that e is a bridge in H. Therefore, K consists of at least
two components in H \ {e}, denoted by K1, . . . ,Km for some m ≥ 2. From (1) it
follows that for every T ∈ T Hr (K), r ∈ K, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, it holds that∑
i∈Kj
mTi (v,H) = v(K)−
∑
h6=j
v(Kh), if r ∈ Kj ,
and ∑
h∈Kj
mTh (v,H) = v(K
j), if r ∈ K \Kj .
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mTi (v,H) = |K \Kj |v(Kj).




























By CE v(Kj) =
∑















which is independent of j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
However, different from the TAT value, the AT value does not meet CF on the
class GHqcfN , as illustrated by Example 3.
Example 3 Consider (v,H) ∈ GHqcfN on a set N of six players with H = {e1, e2, e3},






Figure 4: The quasi-cycle-free hypergraph H in Example 3






9 v({1}) + v(N)− v(N \ {1})
)
.
Deleting e1 from H splits N into two components, N/(H \ {e1}) = {K,K ′}, where
K = {1} and K ′ = N \ {1}, and AT1(v,H \ {e1}) = v({1}). If the AT value satisfies


















because CE of the AT value implies that
∑
i∈N\{1}
ATi(v,H) = v(N)− AT1(v,H) and∑
i∈N\{1}





5 v({1}) + v(N)− v(N \ {1})
)
,
which contradicts to the value of AT1(v,H) obtained above.
Furthermore, both the AT and TAT values on the entire class of hypergraph
games GHN satisfy a rather natural and attractive property of equal surplus of inter-
active players.
• A value ξ satisfies equal surplus of interactive players (ESIP) on G ⊆ GHN if for
every (v,H) ∈ G and interactive players i, j in H it holds that
ξi(v,H)− v({i}) = ξj(v,H)− v({j}).
ESIP states that the players that belong to the same set of hyperlinks, i.e., the
players, which can either cooperate with other players only within the same coalitions,
or they may stay alone within their own singleton coalitions, receive the same amount
of payoff in addition to their own worth. This is a quite reasonable property of fair
division. In the next section ESIP will be used also together with CE and CF to
characterize the TAT value on a particular subclass of semi-cycle-free hypergraph
games, the underlying hypergraphs for which may contain cycles.
Before stating the next lemma and theorem, we introduce some extra notation.
For a hypergraph H ∈ HN , component K ∈ N/H, r ∈ K, and distinct i, j ∈ K, let
T Hr,(i,j)(K) = {T ∈ T
H
r (K) | j ∈ STi } and T Hr,{i,j}(K) = {T ∈ T
H
r (K) | S̄Tj ∩ S̄Ti =
∅}. Note that T Hi,(j,i)(K) = T
H




i (K), T Hj,(i,j)(K) =









partition of T Hr (K) for all r ∈ K \ {i, j}.
Lemma 2 For every H ∈ HN and interactive players i, j ∈ K, K ∈ N/H, it holds
that |T Hi (K)| = |T Hj (K)| and |T Hr,(i,j)(K)| = |T
H
r,(j,i)(K)| for all r ∈ K \ {i, j}.





Since T is an admissible rooted spanning tree of H|K , Hi = Hj , and j ∈ STi , we have





S̄Ti , if h = j,
{i}, if h = i,
S̄Th , if h ∈ K \ {i, j}.
(6)
Since Hi = Hj , we have that (j, i) ∈ T ′ and therefore T ′ ∈ T Hj (K) if r = i and
T ′ ∈ T Hr,(j,i)(K) if r ∈ K \ {i, j}.
Reversely, take any r ∈ K \ {i} and T ′ ∈ T Hr,(j,i)(K). Recall that T
H
j,(j,i)(K) =
T Hj (K). Then there exists a unique T ∈ T Hi (K) if r = j and T ∈ T Hr,(i,j)(K) if r ∈
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K\{i, j} satisfying (6). Therefore, |T Hi (K)| = |T Hj (K)| and |T Hr,(i,j)(K)| = |T
H
r,(j,i)(K)|
for all r ∈ K \ {i, j}.
The lemma shows that for any two given interactive players i and j in some
component K in a hypergraph H, there are always pairwise two admissible rooted
spanning trees T and T ′ in T H(K) for which only the sets of successors of i and j
differ from each other. Therefore, the number of admissible rooted spanning trees for
which i has j as successor equals the number of admissible rooted spanning trees for
which j has i as successor. Moreover, since S̄Th = S̄
T ′
h for all h ∈ K \ {i, j}, it holds
that (STi \ {j})/H = (ST
′
j \ {i})/H.
Next we show that on the entire class of hypergraph games both the AT and TAT
values satisfy ESIP.
Theorem 5 The AT and TAT values on GHN satisfy ESIP.
Proof. Take any (v,H) ∈ GHN and interactive players i, j ∈ N in H. Let K ∈ N/H
be such that i, j ∈ K and let B = {h ∈ K | Hh = Hi} be the set of interactive players
in H that contains i and j. We will prove that
ATi(v,H)−ATj(v,H) = v({i})− v({j})
and
TATi(v,H)− TATj(v,H) = v({i})− v({j}).
Take any T ∈ T Hi (K). Since T Hi,(i,j)(K) = T
H
i (K), it holds that T ∈ T Hi,(i,j)(K).




j = K, {h} ∈ STi /H for all
h ∈ B \{i}, and {h} ∈ ST ′j /H for all h ∈ B \{j}. Whence together with (1) it follows

















with difference v({i})−v({j}). Moreover, mT ′i (v, h) = v({i}) and mTj (v,H) = v({j}),






















mTj (v,H) = v({i})− v({j}).
Next, take any r ∈ K \ {i, j} and T ∈ T Hr,(i,j)(K) and let T
′ ∈ T Hr,(j,i)(K) be as
defined in (6). Then, S̄Ti = S̄
T ′
j , {h} ∈ STi /H for all h ∈ B \ {i}, and {h} ∈ ST
′
j /H
for all h ∈ B \ {j}. Whence together with (1) it follows






















with difference v({i})−v({j}). Moreover, mT ′i (v,H) = v({i}) andmTj (v,H) = v({j}),
also with difference v({i})− v({j}). And, if we take T ∈ T Hr,{i,j}(K), then there exists
h ∈ K \ {i, j} satisfying {i}, {j} ∈ STh /H and therefore mTi (v,H) = v({i}) and
mTj (v,H) = v({j}), again with difference v({i})− v({j}).

















mTj (v,H) = v({i})− v({j})
for all r ∈ K \ {i, j}.
Taking the average of the |K| differences derived above, we obtain TATi(v,H)−










mTj (v,H) = v({i})− v({j}).
Wherefrom by (2) it follows that ATi(v,H)−ATj(v,H) = v({i})− v({j}).
5 An axiomatization of the TAT value
Since the TAT and the AT values coincide on the subclass of cycle-free (hyper)graph
games, the existing axiomatic characterizations of the AT value for cycle-free (hy-
per)graph games are also valid for the TAT value.
Moreover, we obtain an axiomatization of the TAT value on a specific subclass of
the so-called semi-cycle-free hypergraph games, the underlying hypergraphs for which
may contain cycles.
A hypergraph H ∈ HN is semi-cycle-free if there exists a cycle-free hypergraph
H ′ ∈ HN ′ for some N ′ satisfying
(i) N ′ ⊆ N and |H ′| = |H|;
(ii) e′ ∈ H ′ if and only if e′ = e ∩N ′ for some e ∈ H;
(iii′) For every j ∈ N \N ′ it holds that |Hj | ≥ 2 and Hj = Hi for some i ∈ N ′.
Obviously, a cycle-free hypergraph is semi-cycle-free and a semi-cycle-free hyper-
graph is quasi-cycle-free. A semi-cycle-free hypergraph H is derived from a cycle-free
hypergraph H ′ by adding players, if any, which become interactive with a connective
player in N ′. The added players do not change the hyperlink structure of the original
cycle-free hypergraph.
Figure 5 depicts in b) a semi-cycle-free hypergraph H with cycles induced by the










Figure 5: Cycle-free hypergraph H ′ and semi-cycle-free hypergraph H
to become interactive with the single player from N ′, and in e1 ∩ e3 two players from
N \N ′ are added to become interactive with the single player from N ′.
The additional players in a semi-cycle-free hypergraph H have the same degree
as the corresponding players in the inducing cycle-free hypergraph H ′, while this is
not necessarily true for the connective players in a quasi-cycle-free hypergraph, as is
illustrated by Figure 6.
a) Cycle-free b) Semi-cycle-free c) Quasi-cycle-free
Figure 6: Three types of hypergraphs
The next theorem shows that the TAT value for semi-cycle-free hypergraph games
is characterized by CE, CF, and ESIP. From now on the class of semi-cycle-free
hypergraph games on player set N we denote by GHscfN .
Theorem 6 The TAT value on GHscfN is uniquely defined by CE, CF, and ESIP.
Proof. From Theorems 2, 4, and 5 it follows that on GHscfN the TAT value satisfies
CE, CF, and ESIP.
To prove the reverse, let ξ be a value on GHscfN that meets CE, CF, and ESIP.
Take any (v,H) ∈ GHscfN and K ∈ N/H. If H|K = ∅, then K = {i} for some i ∈ N
and CE implies ξi(v,H) = v({i}). Assume H|K 6= ∅. Let H ′ ∈ HN ′ be a cycle-free
hypergraph by which H is induced and let K ′ = K∩N ′. For every i ∈ K ′, let Bi = {i}
if |Hi| = 1 and otherwise Bi = {j ∈ K | Hj = Hi}. Let pe = |{Bi ⊆ e | i ∈ K ′}| for
all e ∈ H|K . Then |e′| = pe, where e′ = e∩N ′. Since H ′ is cycle-free, from Lemma 3
in Kang et al. (2020) it follows that∑
e′∈H′|K′




(pe − 1) = |K ′| − 1.
We show first that there are |K ′| linearly independent equations when applying CE
and CF. CE implies that ∑
i∈K
ξi(v,H) = v(K) (7)
and ∑
i∈K̂
ξi(v,H \ {e}) = v(K̂), K̂ ∈ K/(H\{e}) (8)















for every K1,K2 ∈ K/(H \ {e}) satisfying K1 ∩ e 6= ∅ and K2 ∩ e 6= ∅. Therefore, for
each e ∈ H|K , ∑
h∈K̂
ξh(v,H) = |K̂|αe + v(K̂), (9)















which agrees also with ESIP. Since H is semi-cycle-free, it holds that |K/(H\{e})| =
pe for all e ∈ H|K .
Equations (7) and (9) yield
∑
e∈H|K (pe − 1) + 1 = |K
′| linearly independent
equations on |K| variables, which implies that the total payoff of Bj , j ∈ K ′, is∑
i∈Bj
ξi(v,H) = aj , (10)
where aj , j ∈ K ′, is some constant.
Next, we examine the payoffs of the players in Bh for h ∈ K ′. When |Bh| = 1,
the payoff of the unique player in Bh is determined by equation (10). When |Bh| ≥ 2,
ESIP implies that for every i, j ∈ Bh
ξi(v,H)− v({i}) = ξj(v,H)− v({j}),
yielding |Bh| − 1 linearly independent equations on |Bh| variables. Combined with
equation (10), these equations uniquely determine the payoffs of all players in Bh,
h ∈ K ′. This implies that ξi(v,H) is uniquely determined for all i ∈ K for any
K ∈ N/H.
The next example proves logical independence of axioms CE, CF, and ESIP in
the axiomatization of the TAT value on GHscfN in Theorem 6.
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Example 4 (1) Let value ξ1 on GHscfN be given by
ξ1i (v,H) = 0, for all i ∈ N.
The value ξ1 satisfies all axioms except CE.
(2) Let value ξ2 on GHscfN be given by the Myerson value, cf. van den Nouweland
et al. (1992). The value ξ2 satisfies all axioms except CF.
(3) Let value ξ3 on GHscfN be given by
ξ3i (v,H) =






TATj(v,H), if i ∈ B,
where B is one of the sets of connective interactive players in H, if any exists.
The value ξ3 satisfies all axioms except ESIP.
6 Core stability of the TAT value
Since the TAT and AT values coincide on the subclass of cycle-free (hyper)graph
games, then as a corollary to the core stability of the AT value for superadditive
cycle-free (hyper)graph games, the TAT value of a cycle-free (hyper)graph game with
superadditive underlying TU game is an element of the core. Moreover, it turns
out that both the AT and TAT values are core stable also on the wider subclass of
quasi-cycle-free superadditive hypergraph games.
The core of a hypergraph game is determined as the set of all component efficient
payoff vectors, at which every connected coalition gets at least its own worth. Formally
the core of (v,H) ∈ GHN is defined by
C(v,H) = {x ∈ IRn |
∑
i∈K
xi = v(K),∀K ∈ N/H;
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ∈ CH(N)}.
Theorem 7 For every (v,H) ∈ GHqcfN with superadditive v, AT (v,H), TAT (v,H) ∈
C(v,H).
Proof. For Q ∈ 2N \{∅}, let v|Q denote the subgame of v on Q, where v|Q(S) = v(S)
for all S ⊆ Q. Since S ∈ CH(N) if and only if S ∈ CH|K (K) for some K ∈ N/H, it
holds that x ∈ C(v,H) if and only if (xi)i∈K ∈ C(v|K , H|K) for all K ∈ N/H. We
first prove that for every K ∈ N/H and T ∈ T H(K) it holds that (mTi (v,H))i∈K ∈
C(v|K , H|K).
Take any K ∈ N/H and T ∈ T H(K). From (1) it immediately follows that∑
i∈K m
T
i (v,H) = v(K). Take any S ∈ CH|K (K). Since S ⊆ K and T is an admis-
sible rooted spanning tree of H|K , there exist unique i1, . . . , ik ∈ S for some k ≥ 1





, S̄Tij ∩ S 6= ∅ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and S̄
T
i1
, . . . , S̄Tik are the





in H|K . Because S is connected in H|K , it must
hold that k = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique i ∈ S satisfying S ⊆ S̄Ti .
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Let ŜTS = {j ∈ K \ S | (h, j) ∈ T, h ∈ S} be the set of immediate successors of S
in T . Since H is quasi-cycle-free and S is connected in H|K , S̄Ti is partitioned by the























where the first equality follows from (1), the second equality follows because for
every h ∈ S \ {i} the first term cancels, the third equality follows from the fact
that S̄Ti = S ∪ (
⋃
j∈ŜTS
S̄Tj ), and the inequality follows from repeated application of
superadditivity of v and the fact that S̄Ti is partitioned by S and S̄
T





h (v,H) = v(K), we obtain (m
T
i (v,H))i∈K ∈ C(v|K , H|K).
Since, for every K ∈ N/H, C(v|K , H|K) is a convex set and (TATi(v,H))i∈K and
(ATi(v,H))i∈K are convex combinations of (m
T
i (v,H))i∈K over all T ∈ T H(K), we
obtain that both (TATi(v,H))i∈K and (ATi(v,H))i∈K are elements of C(v|K , H|K)
for all K ∈ N/H.
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